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I. INTRODUCTION
Journalists rely on confidential source material for a substantial
number of news stories.' In exchange for a promise of confidentiality,
1. One study on the relationship between reporters and confidential sources concluded
that the average newsperson relies on confidential sources in 22.2% to 34.4% of her stories.
See Vincent Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 247
(1971). An updated version of the same survey found that, on average, journalists use
confidential source information in 31.25% of their news stories. See John E. Osborn, The
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confidential sources provide reporters with information that may
otherwise be unattainable.2 The reporter-source relationship furthers
the goal of informing the public of political, social and economic
developments in the community. This relationship also creates a
facilitative scheme, enabling confidential sources to reveal facts they
would not disclose otherwise for fear of retaliation.4 Ordinarily, jour-
nalists respect their pledges of confidentiality to sources, feeling mor-
ally obliged to do so.' Nevertheless, reporters occasionally divulge a
source's name either voluntarily or in response to a court order.6
When newspersons voluntarily name confidential sources in news
articles, disputes inevitably arise between reporters and sources con-
cerning the legal ramifications of promises of confidentiality. Perceiv-
ing themselves victimized by a powerful media, aggrieved sources
may seek legal redress for the breach of the reporter's "contractual"
undertaking not to disclose the source's name.7 The imposition of
liability on a news organization for breach of a contract of confidenti-
ality degrades First Amendment guarantees of a free press because
news organizations are, in effect, punished for the publication of
truthful information-the core function of an independent, vigorous
media.' Nevertheless, emerging case law indicates a willingness
Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of
Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 73 (1985). A more recent study indicates that
approximately 52% of national newspaper wire service stories include information obtained
from confidential sources. See Jane D. Brown et al., Invisible Power: Newspaper News Sources
and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 32, 52 (1987).
2. "A confidentiality agreement consists of a promise by a reporter to a news source that
the reporter either will not publish particular information provided by that source or that the
reporter will not attribute such information to that source in a published story." Michael
Dicke, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery for
Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553, 1553 n.1 (1989).
3. Id. at 1569.
4. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (1977) (dealing with a reporter
who had assured confidentiality to his interviewees in order to obtain information about the
life of Karen Silkwood as part of an effort to produce a factually accurate film about her life).
5. One study found that 95% of American journalists do not approve of the identification
of confidential sources. DAVID H. WEAVER & G. CLEVELAND WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN
JOURNALIST: A PORTRAIT OF U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AND THEIR WORK 127-28 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971) (concerning newspersons forced to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries about the identities of confidential
sources allegedly participating in criminal activities).
7. While it is by no means clear that a promise of confidentiality extended by a jounalist
to a source always creates a binding contract, given the informal nature of the promise and the
uncertainty of its terms, this Note assumes that the normal contractual elements are present.
Certainly courts must examine all allegations to determine whether a contract existed between
the reporter and the source. This Note also assumes that normal agency principles govern the
relationship between reporters and their employers, and that the act of granting confidentiality
will be imputed to the news organization. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court historically grants more protection to publication as opposed to
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among courts to strike the balance in favor of a source's contractual
claim.9 Cohen v. Cowles Io is the first Supreme Court case to address
this issue. The majority's holding in Cohen, in favor of a breach of
contract claim against two newspapers that revealed a source's name,
insures that the breach of confidentiality contract scenario will reap-
pear because aggrieved sources are now more readily able to recover
damages from media defendants.'I
A. Facts of Cohen v. Cowles
Dan Cohen was the director of a public relations firm handling
the advertising for the campaign of Wheelock Whitney, the Independ-
ent Republican ("IR") gubernatorial candidate in the 1982 Minnesota
elections. 12 One week before the election, Gary Flakne, a former IR
legislator, uncovered documents which demonstrated that the Demo-
cratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for lieutenant governor, Marlene
Johnson, had been arrested in 1969 for unlawful assembly (the charge
was later dropped) and convicted of petty theft in 1970 (that convic-
tion was vacated a year later). 13 Flakne scheduled a meeting with
several IR supporters to discuss the release of these documents to the
media.' 4 Because of Cohen's ties to the local press, he was chosen as
the person who should release the documents under a condition of
confidentiality. ' 5
Cohen contacted several journalists, including reporters from the
Minneapolis Star and Tribune ("Tribune") and the St. Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch ("Dispatch").16 Cohen indicated that he was willing to
provide documents relating to a candidate in the upcoming election
on a confidential basis.'" The reporters agreed to his terms, and
news gathering activities of the press because publication "directly implicates the principal
roles of the press in the constitutional scheme." Dicke, supra note 2, at 1559-60.
9. See, e.g., Doe v. American Broadcasting Co., 16 Media L. Rptr. 1658, 1659 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (affirming trial court's denial of defendant news organization's motion for
summary judgment in breach of confidentiality contract action).
10. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
11. "If not reversed, this decision opens the door for an enormous range of real or
imagined sources to claim that, in one way or another, they've been victimized by the press."
Two Newspapers Lose Suit For Disclosing a Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1988, § 1, at 6
(quoting Floyd Abrams, a First Amendment legal expert).





17. Cohen specifically proposed:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in the
upcoming election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is
that I will be treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in
19921
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Cohen supplied them with copies of the damaging records."8
In investigating the underlying facts of the charges, the reporters
learned that the charge against Johnson for unlawful assembly had
been dropped and the conviction for petty theft vacated, and a Trib-
une newsperson discovered Gary Flakne's name on the list of persons
having recently reviewed the records.19 The reporter contacted
Flakne and asked him for whom he had obtained the documents.2"
Flakne told the reporter that he procured them for Cohen.2" In light
of this new information, the Tribune's editors sought to persuade
Cohen to release the newspaper from its promise of confidentiality.22
Cohen refused. 23 The editors debated whether a story merely describ-
ing the source as a Whitney supporter or a Whitney campaign mem-
ber would be satisfactory, but then opted to disclose the entire story.24
In addition to reporting on Johnson's arrests and conviction, the pub-
lished story listed Cohen as the source of the documents.25 It also
described his connection to the IR party as a public relations spokes-
person for the Whitney campaign.26 Upon the release of the story,
Cohen's employer promptly fired him.27
Cohen brought a breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresen-
tation action against the Tribune and the Dispatch.21 On the newspa-
pers' motion for summary judgment, the judge ruled that "[t]his is not
a case about free speech, rather it is one about contracts and misrepre-
sentation, ' 29 thereby eliminating any consideration of First Amend-
ment principles. The jury, finding that both newspapers breached
their contracts with Cohen and made material misrepresentations of
fact to Cohen, awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages.3 0 A divided panel of the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's finding of a breach of contract but
any material in connection with this, and that you will also agree that you're not













28. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rptr. 1460, 1461 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987).
29. Id. at 1464.
30. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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reversed on the misrepresentation claim.3 On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the misrepresentation claim,
but reversed on the contract claim, holding that the disclosure of
Cohen's name failed to support the breach of contract claim. a2 The
court proceeded to consider an alternative ground of promissory
estoppel and concluded that the promise of confidentiality received by
Cohen was unenforceable under this theory.33 The court further held
that a successful contract claim would violate the newspapers' First
Amendment rights.34
B. Holding of the Supreme Court
By a five to four vote, the United States Supreme Court recently
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court decision.35 Although the
Court's framing of the issue properly pinpoints the conflict between
First Amendment rights and state contract law in the confidential
source/breach of contract context,36 the Court cursorily dismissed the
First Amendment concerns raised by this case. Holding that the Min-
nesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability
because it applies to the daily transactions of all Minnesota citizens,
the Court viewed the doctrine's inhibition on the press' function as a
"constitutionally insignificant" burden.37 The Court further dimin-
ished the restrictive impact of state enforcement of contract law on
truthful publications by emphasizing that "any restrictions which
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-
31. Id. at 254. In reversing the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the court eliminated
Cohen's recovery of punitive damages. Id.
32. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202, 205 (Minn. 1990).
33. Id. at 205.
34. The court found it to be of "critical significance ... that the promise of anonymity
arises in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our
democratic society, namely, a political source involved in a political campaign." Id.
35. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
36. "The question before us is whether the First Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from
recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a
promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information." Id. at 2516.
37. The Court likened this case to a "line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news." Id. at 2518; see, e.g.,
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (news
organizations must pay nondiscriminatory taxes); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977) (the press may not publish copyrighted materials without
obeying the copyright laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)
(the media must comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (the press may not restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (the media must obey the National Labor
Relations Act).
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imposed." 38 The Court also implied that the Tribune and the Dis-
patch acted irresponsibly and with malice in breaching their pledge to
Cohen,39 thereby suggesting that both news organizations deserved
punishment.
The majority's holding produced two dissents. Justice Blackmun
criticized the Court's assumption that a promissory estoppel action
imposes only a slight burden on speech. Arguing that the prohibition
of the publication of important political speech is the violation conve-
niently overlooked by the majority, he advocated a higher standard by
which to gauge the legality of state enforcement of contract law in this
particular setting. Accordingly, "[t]o the extent that truthful speech
may ever be sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, it must
be in furtherance of a state interest 'of the highest order.' "I Justice
Souter espoused a balancing approach, concluding that the balance
here should have been struck in favor of the newspapers because of
the paramount public interest in receiving information relevant to
political discourse. Souter accused the majority of erroneously apply-
ing the reasoning of the general applicability cases to this situation.4"
Souter distinguished between laws of general applicability that
address the commercial activities and relationships of the press, and
laws that directly affect the newsgathering and publication functions
of the press-noting that the latter must be judged in light of constitu-
tional proscriptions. 2 Emphasizing the special role of the media as
an institution pertaining to the public, Souter argued that any state
action suppressing truthful information relevant to public discourse
was presumptively invalid. Since Cohen's name "expanded the uni-
verse of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota vot-
ers," Souter concluded that the newspapers chose correctly in
deciding to breach their promise to Cohen.43
This Note disputes the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
Cohen because of its failure to acknowledge the inhibiting effects that
the enforcement of Cohen's contract action has on the reporting of
truthful news. Cohen's name and his ties to the IR party acquired a
newsworthy value independent of the Johnson story because this
information provided evidence indicating that the IR party intended
38. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
39. "[R]espondents obtained Cohen's name only by making a promise which they did not
honor." Id.
40. Id. at 2522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).





to use dishonorable campaign tactics." This opinion unjustifiably
punishes the media despite the Court's belief that compensatory dam-
ages are "just another cost of doing business." The result of compen-
satory damage awards in breach of contract actions is similar to
damage awards in libel actions in terms of the palpable chilling effects
on the press.45 By far, the greatest harm posed by this decision is that
lower courts facing similar claims will follow the Supreme Court's
lead and rule in favor of dissatified confidential sources without
undertaking any analysis of First Amendment concerns. Even though
courts should be concerned with enforcing the principles underlying
contract law, in the context of this case, that is just one factor to be
weighed against constitutional guarantees of free speech. Courts must
not overlook the fact that, when newsworthy information is withheld
by enforcing confidentiality promises, public discourse is inevitably
diminished.46
This Note analyzes the conflict between contract doctrine and
First Amendment concerns in the breach of contract of confidentiality
setting. Part II provides a brief overview of the historical role of a
free press and the function of contract law. This section also presents
a summary of the types of sources and their motivations for seeking
confidentiality and some of the reasons prompting media defendants
to breach promises of confidentiality. Part III examines the evolution
of defamation law and cases reconciling reputational interests with
the First Amendment. This provides a helpful analogy for courts
attempting to harmonize the competing interests at stake in this
emerging field. This section also explores statutory and common law
developments recognizing a reportorial privilege against compelling
journalists to reveal their sources of information. The doctrinal
resemblance between these cases and breach of contract of confidenti-
ality issues indicates that a balancing standard is the best means avail-
able by which to safeguard the publication activities of the press. Part
44. The Supreme Court previously acknowledged the newsworthy value of this type of
information. "Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty,
malfeasance, or improper motivation ... Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1973).
45. See, e.g., Albert Scardino, Newspaper in New Case Over Naming Source, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1988, § 1, at 14. A source quoted in a story claimed a reporter had promised her
confidentiality. Id. Because editors could not determine immediately whether the source had
been promised confidentiality, they decided to destroy 600,000 copies of the Sunday magazine
supplement awaiting delivery at distribution centers around the state rather than risk a
lawsuit. Id.
46. "[P]romises of confidentiality by the press are not contracts for the sale of goods or
services, but rather, agreements for the suppression of speech." Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons:
Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 648
(1991).
1992]
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IV proposes a contextual balancing standard based on several factors
unique to confidential source/reporter relationships. This standard is
designed to compel courts to consider the First Amendment concerns
raised by such claims and to reconcile the constitutional right to a free
press with the interest of the states in enforcing private agreements.
II. EXPLORING THE TENSION BETWEEN FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT IN REPORTER/
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE RELATIONS
A. The Role of a Free Press
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."47 In addi-
tion to First Amendment protection of the right to free speech, which
appears to include unfettered expression by media entities,4" the tradi-
tion of an autonomous press is deeply rooted in the social and legal
fabric of the United States. Consequently, any state-imposed limita-
tions on the reporting of news automatically trigger constitutional
protections. The rationale for this heightened scrutiny of laws inhib-
iting news reporting is that the communications media serves a para-
mount role in defending public interests by keeping the citizenry
informed. Indeed, "speech via the press is much more significant as a
contribution to the democratic dialogue than is speech through
nonmedia channels.
'49
The press' function is not limited solely to informing the public.5 °
"[T]he press serves as a vehicle and conduit for individual expres-
sion."" Moreover, the press educates people by "offerring criticism,
and providing a forum for debate and discussion."52 Finally, the pri-
mary purpose of a free press is "to create a fourth institution ouside
the Government as an additional check on the three official
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. "The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to
express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses specifically on the liberty to
disseminate expression broadly and comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
vehicle of information and opinion." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1417 (1 th
ed. 1985) (quoting Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
49. Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does
It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975).
50. "It is... a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of
a free press is to insure that a newspaper will serve as a ... neutral conduit of information
between the people and their elected leaders." Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 634 (1975).




branches. '5 3 By carefully scrutinizing elected leaders and their poli-
cies, news organizations insure effective self-governance because
informed voters select politicians who will promote the voters' inter-
ests. Because the media operates as a quasi-public institution, First
Amendment proscriptions against inhibiting truthful news reporting
are specifically tailored to safeguard the public's right to know.54
News organizations are not unlike fiduciaries of the public in that
they are responsible for providing a constant stream of information."
Although the press enjoys a preferred status in the "galaxy of
rights conferred by the Constitution,"56 the press is not immune to the
rule of law. The press must obey laws which have negligible effects on
the dissemination of speech" as well as laws directly regulating
expression.58 In addition, the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused
to apply an equal degree of constitutional protection to different
classes of speech, thereby creating a hierarchy of informational cate-
gories. At the apex of First Amendment freedoms is the discussion of
"public affairs and public officials," which the Supreme Court has
described as "the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily
designed to keep within the area of free discussion."" "Fighting
words"60 and "obscenity" 61 are wholly excluded from constitutionally
protected free speech while commercial speech, which includes com-
53. Stewart, supra note 50, at 634.
54. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975). The Supreme
Court stated:
[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those
operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to
report fully and accurately.
Id.
55. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 241 (1991). The author further notes that "we do not
protect the press for itself, but rather because it serves to guarantee other fundamental values."
Id.
56. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
57. See supra note 37.
58. Illustrations of laws directly regulating what a news organization may publish include
defamation laws as well as laws created to prevent invasion of privacy. See, e.g., The Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
59. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 296-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring). "There are very few
'givens' in First Amendment jurisprudence, but among them is the proposition that the
dissemination of information about government is the core value to be protected under the
rubric of 'freedom of speech, or of the press.' " Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg
Revisited: Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 34
(1988).
60. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
61. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
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mercial advertising or speech that merely proposes a commercial
transaction, is considered less valuable and therefore entitled to
reduced First Amendment protection.62 Defamatory statements and
publications leading to actionable invasion of privacy claims63 receive
significantly greater constitutional protection. A state must have a
compelling interest in enforcing laws proscribing the publication of
these types of speech, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the states' legitimate goals. If the state's interest does not out-
weigh First Amendment concerns in promoting free expression, a
court will not uphold the challenged law.
In light of the Court's approach in granting varying levels of con-
stitutional protection to distinct categories of speech, it would be
overly broad to argue that, under all circumstances, confidentiality
promises between sources and journalists should take a backseat to
First Amendment mandates. 6 First Amendment jurisprudence has
never advocated such an absolutist approach. 65  Furthermore, a
regime in which the press is free to act as it wishes, without regard to
legal constraints imposed on other individuals and institutions, would
create a tyrant. Courts must weigh the policies underlying laws that
have more than incidental effects on the content of speech against
First Amendment principles, in order to strike a balance between the
value to our society of an unfettered press with other countervailing
but legitimate interests. Thus, courts must examine contracts limiting
the media's ability to publish truthful information with this balance in
mind.
B. Contract Principles
Contract theory vindicates individual interests, allowing parties
to exercise personal autonomy in making enforceable agreements.66
Through contractual jurisprudence, courts promote societal ends by
enforcing socially useful agreements, while refusing to uphold agree-
62. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 n.24 (1976).
63. These actions involve "true disclosures about the plaintiff's personal life that are
embarassing invasions of privacy, not newsworthy, and subject to liability." GUNTHER, supra
note 48, at 1062.
64. But see Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
21, 24 (July/Aug. 1988).
65. "The Court has never held that there is an absolute privilege to publish all true
information, regardless of what other interests are implicated." Levi, supra note 46, at 657.
66. Dicke, supra note 2, at 1567. "Contract is an aspect of freedom. The ability to
contract is one of the features of a free man in a free society." G.H.L. Fridman, On the Nature
of Contract, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 627, 636 (1983).
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ments that are against public policy.67 Contract law is perhaps the
only legal vehicle for recognizing and upholding the right of individu-
als to freely exercise their will by enforcing voluntary promises. The
principles underlying contract doctrine predate the Constitution and
have cognizable social and moral values that operate independently of
the formal legal system. Simply put, societal norms consider it unfair
for one party to induce another party to make a promise, derive the
benefit of that promise and then subsequently breach the concomitant
obligation with impunity. Society is concerned when the promisor
incurs a detriment while the promisee escapes unscathed and in a bet-
ter position than he was before the contract. These legal and ethical
concerns apply to commercial as well as non-commercial contracts.
With non-commercial contracts, however, other competing interests,
such as the right to a free press, may caution against a formalistic
application of contract law. Breach of contract of confidentiality
cases highlight the latter scenario.
When a reporter promises a source confidentiality, the traditional
contract elements are present.68 A source's request for confidentiality
constitutes an offer.69 A reporter's consent to this condition consti-
tutes acceptance. 70 The consideration flowing from the reporter is the
reporter's promise of confidentiality, and the consideration flowing
from the source is the information imparted to the reporter.7 I
Reporter-source relationships are mutually beneficial. Reporters
obtain newsworthy information otherwise not available, and sources
achieve their aim of disclosing information while protecting their
identities. The advantages both parties derive from these relation-
ships explain the increase in the use of confidentiality source material
over the past few years.72
67. "[Iln general, parties may contract as they wish," but there are certain instances in
which "the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of
society." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8 (1981). One example of an
agreement against social policy is the non-competition covenant in the employment setting.
These contracts typically provide that if an employee decides to leave his place of employment,
he may not directly compete with his former employer for a certain length of time after his
departure or he may not seek similar employment with a competitor within a limited
geographic boundary. See DEBORAH A. DEMoTr, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP: 'DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 147-60 (1991). Many
jurisdictions are hostile to consensual restraints on competition. Id.; see, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 16600 (West 1987) (statutory provisions make void "every contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.").
68. A valid contract consists of an offer, acceptance and consideration. PAUL R.
CONWAY, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 42 (3d ed. 1968).
69. Dicke, supra note 2, at 1567.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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An important principle of contract law is that remedies are based
on strict liability, without regard to fault. 7 An aggrieved party need
only establish the existence of the elements of a contract and that the
defendant breached it in order to recover.74 Thus, any reasons offer-
red by media defendants to justify the breach of a promise to a confi-
dential source are irrelevant under traditional contract doctrine.
Similarly, the newsworthy value of the information published as a
result of the breach is not a defense to a finding of liability. The confi-
dential source/breach of contract cases clearly do not fit within tradi-
tional contract analysis, which does not provide an analytical vehicle
for balancing as well as protecting the countervailing First Amend-
ment interests. Therefore, any standard developed to accomodate
these competing values must focus on the dynamics of the reporter-
source relationship.
C. Confidential Sources and Their Relationships with the Press
Confidential sources are indispensable to the professional jour-
nalist's task of "gathering, analyzing, and publishing the news."' 7
There are different types of sources primarily distinguished by the rea-
sons motivating them to seek confidentiality. Sources include mem-
bers of politically unpopular dissident groups who seek to protect
their identities for fear of government retaliation.76 Private individu-
als also occasionally disclose information concerning governmental or
corporate misdeeds on a confidential basis in order to protect their
jobs or their personal safety.77 Currently, the predominant type of
confidential source are public officials who "view anonymity as the
price the public must pay to learn certain information about its gov-
ernment. '78  A significant percentage of former government officials
admit to acting as confidential sources during their tenure, routinely
providing the press with information about government affairs.79
Indeed, confidential relationships in the government setting have
73. Fridman, supra note 66, at 648.
74. Any failure to perform as promised constitutes a breach. H. HUNTER, MODERN LAW
OF CONTRACTS-BREACH AND REMEDIES § 2.01 (1986).
75. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711-12 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675 (reporter interviewed several members of the
Black Panther party on a confidential basis to secure information about their views).
77. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1977) (reporter
insured confidentiality to several witnesses he interviewed to obtain information for a project
to make a film about the life of Karen Silkwood).
78. Langley & Levine, supra note 59, at 44.
79. One study found that 42% of former federal officials in policymaking positions
acknowledged that they had provided confidential information to the press while in office. See
MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 172 (1986).
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become so common that journalists and public officials have devel-
oped a "code language" by which to determine how information will
be published."s Reporters encourage this trend because, without con-
fidential source material, "it would be impossible to understand gov-
ernment, especially diplomacy and national security."'"
Confidential sources who provide journalists with information
about the government are referred to metaphorically as "leaks." 2
Some leaks operate clandestinely, while others, who are authorized by
a higher authority, are better known as "plants."8 " Government leaks
are further subdivided according to their incentives for leaking: the
ego leak,84 the goodwill leak, 5 the policy leak,86 the animus leak,87
the trial balloon leak, 8 the whistleblower leak 9 and the record cor-
rection leak. 90 This categorization reflects a broad spectrum of leaks
and their motivations, with some sources deserving more protection
than others. The prototypical whistleblower is admired for his cour-
age in exposing the truth, whereas the anonymous source of "govern-
ment disinformation campaigns and political smear tactics" is
scorned. 91 While some sources legitimately request confidentiality in
80. "Off-the-record" comments cannot be used in any story. STEPHEN HESS, THE
WASHINGTON REPORTERS 19 (1981). "Background" remarks can be used to identify the
source in a general fashion without naming him. Id.
81. POWE, supra note 55, at 172. Specifically, "such information is invaluable to reporters
for verifying on-the-record statements, providing tips or leads on new stories, persuading
editors to give a story more prominence, determining the proper significance or meaning of
certain facts and developments, and inducing reticent sources to divulge information by
demonstrating to them that they are not the only ones who are talking to reporters." Osborn,
supra note 1, at 73.
82. "A leak is a covert transaction carried out in strict anonymity at a time when the
government itself is not officially opening the tap." Langley & Levine, supra note 59, at 29.
83. Plants are defined as "authorized distributions of information to the press for which no
particular government agent wishes to take public responsibility." Levi, supra note 46, at 628.
84. The ego leak is motivated "to satisfy a sense of self-importance." STEPHEN HESS, THE
GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 77 (1984).
85. The goodwill leak wishes to develop a good relationship with the press as "a play for
future favor." Id.
86. Policy leakers are making "a straightforward pitch for or against a proposal." Id.
87. The animus leak is "used to settle grudges." Id. Its purpose is to harm an opponent
and undermine his position. Id.
88. The trial balloon leak reveals "a proposal that is under consideration in order to assess
its assets and liabilities." Id.
89. Government whistleblowers comprise "frustrated civil servants who feel they cannot
correct a perceived wrong through regular government channels." Id. The term has also been
applied to private individuals. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th
Cir. 1977).
90. Record correction leaks leak "in order to correct erroneous information circulating in
the press." HESS, supra note 84, at 77.
91. "[T]he prototypes reflect a commitment to the following ideals: fully-informed,
truthful public discourse; open, clean, efficient and accountable government; conformity to law
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order to protect their jobs or their lives, in some situations, promises
of confidentiality are elicited by clever sources who wish to disguise
their intended maneuverings of the press. If the confidential source
intends to harm a political adversary and his identity is disclosed, his
objectives may backfire as there is an appearance that the source is
engaging in sinister techniques for political expediency. Other sources
might seek to gauge the popularity of an untested political, social or
economic plan without risking being linked to a policy that may prove
unpopular later.
Journalists traditionally respect confidentiality agreements with
their sources regardless of the source's motives. This practice is par-
tially fueled by a strong ethical drive to honor one's promises at all
costs, even if a reporter must face incarceration for refusing to reveal
a source.92 Reporters are also subject to institutional pressures which
prevent them from naming sources. If a newsperson routinely
breaches confidentiality promises, existing and potential sources will
hesitate to distribute information to him, thereby making it more diffi-
cult for the reporter to uncover newsworthy items and thus impeding
professional advancement.93 Another viable concern is that, if news
organizations cave in to external demands to disclose confidential
sources' identities, their autonomy may be compromised for they will
appear to have become "investigative arms of government.
94
Despite the economic and ethical disincentives for the media to
disclose the names of sources, editors often decide to violate promises
of confidentiality. 95 Editors and reporters, however, exercise this
choice discretely, and disclose confidential sources only under certain
narrowly defined circumstances. Reporters may disclose a source's
identity if the source dies. 96 The discovery that the source has delib-
erately misrepresented material facts or that the source providing
information about a crime turns out to be involved in the crime may
also prompt disclosure.97 The fear of substantial damage awards in
in industry and government; and a powerful and independent press capable of informing the
public and policing the state." Levi, supra note 46, at 712 (footnotes omitted).
92. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971).
93. "Since journalistic careers can at the very least be stalled by a reduction in information
flow, it is very risky for reporters to antagonize important government officials." Levi, supra
note 46, at 682.
94. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 n.41.
95. See generally Langley & Levine, supra note 64, at 21 (noting the "emerging
phenomenon of reporters breaking faith with their sources").
96. Bob Woodward of The Washington Post revealed that the now deceased former
director of the CIA, William Casey, was one of his sources. Id.
97. In 1977, a reporter promised Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell confidentiality
in exchange for damaging information concerning Senator Charles Percy. The reporter
checked the information, found it to be absolutely false, and then broke his promise by writing
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libel actions also induces disclosure when necessary to avoid liabil-
ity.98 In addition, newspapers may perceive a professional obligation
to disclose a source when such disclosure is necessary to "set the rec-
ord straight," as when Newsweek indicated Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North was the leak responsible for revealing highly sensitive informa-
tion related to the Achille Lauro hijacking. 99
More courts will face breach of contract of confidentiality actions
as media defendants continue to disclose their sources, thereby induc-
ing aggrieved sources to seek legal remedies. In order to properly
address the competing values at stake in these cases, courts must con-
sider the reasons profferred by the news organization for breaching a
pledge of confidentiality, and the source's reasons for requesting ano-
nymity. An exploration of the jurisprudential history of other areas
of law directly affecting freedom of the press will provide courts with
a greater sensitivity of the policy concerns in this emerging field.
III. PERSPECTIVES PROVIDED BY OTHER AREAS OF LAW
WHERE THE RIGHT TO A FREE PRESS MUST BE BALANCED
AGAINST COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS
A. The Development of Defamation: From Strict Liability to a
Balancing Approach
The evolution of defamation law provides a useful analogy to
guide courts in the resolution of breach of contract of confidentiality
issues. In attempting to harmonize the conflict between reputational
interests and First Amendment principles, New York Times v. Sulli-
van 100 and its progeny present a scheme that favors equilibrium over
absolutism. 10' While the interests competing with free speech values
in defamation cases are distinguishible from the competing interests in
a story about how Powell had passed along erroneous information to smear Senator Percy.
Richard D. Smyser, There are Sources and Then There are "Sourcerers," 5 Soc. RESP.
JOURNALISM L. MED. 13, 17-18 (1979).
98. Langley & Levine, supra note 64, at 22.
99. Oliver North and CIA Director William Casey discussed secret operations with the
media once they were guaranteed anonymity. During the Iran-contra hearings, North testified
that "leaks" had led to the publication of information about the interception of an Egyptian
plane carrying the suspected hijackers of the Achille Lauro. North added that he believed the
"leaks 'very seriosly compromised our intelligence activities.'" Shortly thereafter, Newsweek
revealed that it had obtained details about the interception from North himself. Id.
100. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
101. Absolutism in defamation means either that the weight of the constitutional guarantee
or that the right to protect one's reputation from the publication of malicious falsehoods will
always frustrate the other. As the Court recognized in New York Times, "libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
satisfying the First Amendment." Id. at 269.
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confidential source cases, the policies underlying defamation jurispru-
dence demonstrate that a balancing of competing interests is neces-
sary to prevent the inhibition of speech that unavoidably follows the
formalistic application of contract law.
At common law, defamation was a strict liability tort."°2 All a
plaintiff needed to prove in order to prevail was that the defendant
had published a statement tending to injure the plaintiff's reputa-
tion.103 Since actual injury was not an element of the action, proof of
the defamatory publication gave rise to a "galloping" presumption of
damages. '" The defenses available to the defendant included truth,
10 5
privilege, 06 or fair comment and criticism,'07 but these defenses were
so narrowly circumscribed as to provide the publisher with no shield.
Because defamation plaintiffs were not required to show intent, reck-
lessness or even negligence by the defendant, news organizations were
often left in the unenviable position of being financially liable when-
ever an inadvertent falsehood was printed. 108 Publishers fearful of lit-
igation costs and libelous damages would monitor all news items,
censoring any information thought to be remotely defamatory. 0 9 The
obvious chilling effects on the press of early defamation law remained
unchecked until the Supreme Court wiped the slate clean with its
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan.110
1. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
In New York Times v. Sullivan, L.B. Sullivan, the police commis-
sioner of Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that he had been libeled in a
102. An individual incurred liability by publishing written or spoken material with a
tendency "so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1938). One who published false and
defamatory material was strictly liable for damages, even without proof of actual harm. Id.
103. Id.
104. Kurt Hirsch, Throwing the Book at Revelations: First Amendment Implications of
Enforcing Reporters' Promises, 18 REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 161, 165 (1991).
105. Truth was a valid defense, because where the defamatory statement was true, the
plaintiff's reputation would have been justifiably damaged. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581A (1938).
106. Some states allowed a defense of privilege whereby the defendant could escape liability
because the defamation was communicated in furtherance of some important social interest.
In general, the immunity was only available with regard to statements made during
government proceedings or communications between husbands and wives. Hirsch, supra note
104, at 165.
107. Fair comment and criticism protected expression of defamatory criticism and opinion
on matters of public concern based on facts established as true. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 606 comment b (1938).
108. Hirsch, supra note 104, at 165.
109. Id.
110. 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
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New York Times advertisement paid for by the "Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South.""
1 I
The advertisement, which never mentioned Sullivan's name,
described certain incidents of racial confrontation between the police
and African-American leaders in Montgomery." 2 Sullivan proved
that despite his non-involvement in any of the episodes depicted in the
report, certain Montgomery residents had read some of the ad's state-
ments as referring to him by virtue of his position as the public official
in charge of police affairs." 3 Although Sullivan did not show that he
sufferred actual pecuniary loss as a result of the alleged libel, the jury
awarded him $500,000 in damages."I4
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that First
Amendment constraints mandated that public officials' like Sullivan
could not recover any damages for a defamatory falsehood unless they
proved that the statement was made with "'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.""' 6 Citing a strong national committment to
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues, the.
Court recognized the inevitability of erroneous statements as a neces-
sary cost of free speech that outweighed the state's interest in provid-
ing redress to individuals with injured reputations.' The Court
rejected the faultless standard of the common law because it resulted
in media defendants often censoring important information in order
to avoid the threat of litigation costs and libel damages."18  The
Court's material departure from the common law approach to defa-
mation thus gave news organizations more breathing space within
which to rigorously pursue and report news concerning public
officials.
Subsequently, the Court applied the New York Times rationale to
I 1l. Id. at 256-57.
112. Id. at 257-58. Although there were some minor factual inaccuracies in the
advertisement, Sullivan's claim was premised on the assertion that the incidents imputed to
him depicted him as the instigator of racist harassment. Id.
113. Id. at 258.
114. Id. at 256.
115. The term "public official" applies "at the very least to those among the hierarchy of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for
or control over the conduct of government affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
116. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
117. "Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Id. at
270 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678
(1942)).
118. "[T]he pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." Id. at
278.
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expand the actual malice standard to include unelected public figures.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,"19 a university football coach sued
the Saturday Evening Post for an article it published that accused the
coach of conspiring to "fix" a football game.' 20 The Court defined
public figures to encompass those who "commanded a substantial
amount of independent public interest at the time of the publica-
tions."'' The Court held that public figures, like elected officials,
would be required to prove the more burdensome actual malice stan-
dard in order to recover in a libel action because public figures pur-
posefully "thrust[ ] . . . [themselves] into the vortex of an important
controversy."
22
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia 23 was the first Supreme Court case
dealing with a defamation action brought by a private individual.
This decision represents the pinnacle in terms of the protections
afforded media defendants against libel claims. The Court repudiated
its prior emphasis on the public or private status of the individual
bringing the claim as the methodology by which to ascertain ultimate
recovery.' 24 Instead, the Court focused on whether the substance of
the allegedly defamatory utterance related to issues of public or gen-
eral concern in order to decide whether the actual malice standard
applied.
George Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist magazines who
was arrested twice within three days for selling allegedly obscene
materials. 25  Following the arrests, the defendant's radio station
broadcast stories referring to the magazines distributed by Rosen-
bloom as "obscene" and labeling him a "girlie-book peddler[ ]" run-
ning a "smut literature racket."'' 26 Rosenbloom was subsequently
acquitted of the criminal charges when it was adjudged, that as a mat-
ter of law, the distributed magazines were not obscene. 27 He then
brought a defamation action against the radio station.
28
The Supreme Court held that, although Rosenbloom was a pri-
vate individual who had not voluntarily sought publicity, he could not
prevail because he failed to establish actual malice by the radio sta-
119. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
120. Id. at 135.
121. Id. at 154.
122. Id. at 155.
123. 403 U.S. 29 (1970).
124. "Drawing a distinction between 'public' and 'private' figures makes no sense in terms
of the First Amendment guarantees." Id. at 45-46.
125. Id. at 32-33.
126. Id. at 34-35.




tion. 2 9 The Court reasoned that the police campaign to enforce the
obscenity laws involved an issue of public interest and that an analysis
focusing on Rosenbloom's status as either a public personality or pri-
vate individual was misplaced and insufficient to meet First Amend-
ment guarantees.13° The new public interest standard articulated by
the Rosenbloom majority greatly expanded the range of protection
accorded media defendants because private individuals engaging in
activities of public interest would now be required to demonstrate
actual malice by the defendant in order to recover. In addition, public
figures would still be held to an actual malice standard since their
activities always fell within the purview of public interest.
A few years later, the Court retreated slightly from the expan-
siveness of Rosenbloom in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 131 The case
involved Elmer Gertz, an attorney retained by the family of a young
man killed by a policeman to represent them in a civil action against
the officer. 132 American Opinion magazine published an article con-
cerning the policeman's trial for murder, contending that testimony
against the officer had been falsified and that the prosecution was par-
ticipating in a Communist conspiracy against the police. 133 The
report inaccurately named Gertz as a co-conspirator in the alleged
plot and labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter."' 
34
Gertz filed a libel action against the magazine. 35 Applying the
Rosenbloom public interest standard, the trial court held that, even
though Gertz was a private individual, he could not recover unless he
established actual malice by the defendant because the article involved
a matter of public interest. 136
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed by reintroducing the
public versus private individual distinction first advanced in New York
Times. The Court reasoned that Gertz, as a private person, "relin-
quished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name,
and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for
redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood."'' 37 The Court
indicated that "so long as they do not impose liabilty without fault,
129. Id. at 52.
130. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
'voluntarily' choose to become involved." Id. at 43.
131. 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
132. Id. at 325.
133. Id. at 326.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 327.
136. Id. at 329-30.
137. Id. at 345.
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the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of lia-
bility for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual." 3 ' Thus, Gertz, as a private individual,
merely needed to show that the defendant had failed to exercise rea-
sonable care in checking the veracity of the story it published. The
Court also curtailed the possibility that private individuals could
recover exorbitant libel damages by holding that, unless actual malice
was shown, plaintiffs would be entitled only to compensatory damages
for actual injury. 
139
To date, New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny adhere to a
standard requiring public officials or figures to prove actual malice by
the media defendant before they may receive compensation. Private
individuals need not meet the strictures of actual malice in order to
recover, but if the plaintiff establishes mere negligence by the media
entity, damages will be limited to those actually sustained. Further-
more, the Supreme Court has expressly held that no state may impose
a strict liability standard in libel actions, thereby precluding any
return to pre-New York Times v. Sullivan defamation jurisprudence.
2. THE LESSON OF DEFAMATION
A review of the development of defamation jurisprudence dem-
onstrates that courts gradually realized that all libel actions place
First Amendment principles at odds with the interests of states in pro-
tecting an individual's reputation. The common law faultless defama-
tion standard crippled good faith efforts by the press to vigorously
pursue and publish news for fear of being subjected to substantial liti-
gation expenses and libel damages. The First Amendment was specif-
ically designed to guard against such chilling effects on truthful news
reporting. Yet courts could not categorically strike down all defama-
tion actions on the basis of First Amendment interests because "abso-
lute protection for the communication media requires a total sacrifice
of the competing value served by the law of defamation."'" Obvi-
ously the greater protection accorded media entities since New York
Times v. Sullivan has not been without cost. The actual malice test
approximates a showing of intent and is difficult to prove; therefore,
some falsehoods will inevitably be published for which no recovery is
possible.' Acknowledging the imperfections in reconciling defama-
138. Id. at 347.
139. Id. at 349.
140. Id. at 341.
141. This standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to
media self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of
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tion law with the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted
that such a cost "is a necessary evil associated with promoting the free
and robust exchange of ideas envisioned under the First
Amendment."
4 2
Although some commentators advocate importing defamation
standards directly to the breach of contract of confidentiality cases,143
this Note suggests that the lesson to be derived from the development
of defamation jurisprudence is that courts must balance competing
interests which restrain truthful news reporting against First Amend-
ment values. When promises to uphold confidentiality inhibit the
truthful reporting of newsworthy items, such as Cohen's identity and
his connection to the IR party, First Amendment values are directly
implicated. As in the defamation context, granting the press greater
protections in these contract cases will undoubtedly entail certain
costs. In certain cases, sources who legitimately expect media defend-
ants to maintain promises of confidentiality will be precluded from
recovering damages because they will be unable to prove the existence
of a contract or because the newsworthy value in the disclosure of
their names overshadows the interest in enforcing the promise. If def-
amation cases recognize that there are necessary costs in order to pro-
mote a free press, the same principle must be true of the breach of
contract of confidentiality cases.
There remains another unexplored link between the defamation
and breach of contract of confidentiality actions as illustrated by the
Cohen case. Cohen's complaints resemble those typically alleged in
defamation suits. His injuries were characterized as "a kick in the
face," "embarassing," and "humiliating," and Cohen's counsel asked
the jury to "restore ... [Cohen's] good name.""' "Casting Cohen's
claim as a contract action may have been a strategic decision aimed at
avoiding the burdensome constitutional requirements imposed upon
plaintiffs asserting tort claims against media defendants."' 45 In such
cases, courts must become alert to the attempt to seek redress for
defamatory falsehood. Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some
intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the
New York Times test.
Id. at 342.
142. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
143. See, e.g., Dicke, supra note 2, at 1579-85; Hirsch, supra note 104, at 202-05.
144. Hirsch, supra note 104, at 180 (quoting Brief of Appellant Cowles Media Co. at 10,
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (No. C8-88-2631)).
145. Id. "The most powerful people in society would leap to the chance to sue reporters if
they did not have to prove falsity and defamation." New Yorker in the Fray on Journalism and
Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, March 21. 1989, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
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defamations through the "backdoor" of contract actions and directly
impose First Amendment principles.
B. The Reportorial Privilege: A Further Balancing Scheme
Common law or statutory reportorial privileges give journalists
either an absolute or qualified right to refuse to reveal the identities of
their sources in response to judicial, legislative or administratively
issued subpoenas. Media defendants typically assert reportorial privi-
leges in grand jury, 141 criminal 147 or defamation 48 proceedings.
Although a lack of uniformity exists among jurisdictions as to the
scope of the protection, 49 the ostensible purpose for this privilege is
to secure the news gathering function of the press. 5' Therefore, the
privilege pertains exclusively to news organizations and not
sources. 5 ' The development of reportorial privilege jurisprudence
informs the breach of contract of confidentiality debate because case
law and legislative enactments have formulated tests to balance the
need for a free press with the public's right to exact the truth in judi-
cial proceedings. These balancing tests show that judicially managea-
ble standards are both possible and essential to the proper resolution
of breach of contract of confidentiality cases.
1. BRANZBURG V. HA YES AND ITS AFTERMATH
Branzburg v. Hayes is the only Supreme Court case to address
the issue of whether journalists have a First Amendment right to
refuse to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries. 1 2 The
opinion consists of four consolidated cases involving journalists who
declined to disclose the names of their confidential sources to grand
juries. Two of the consolidated cases, Branzburg v. Pound' and
Branzburg v. Meigs, 154 involved stories prepared by Paul Branzburg, a
staff reporter for the Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in
146. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
147. See, e.g., In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
148. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
149. See generally Sharon K. Malheiro, The Journalist's Reportorial Privilege-What Does
it Protect and What are its Limits?, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 79 (1988-89) (discussing various
statutory and common law treatments of the reportorial privilege).
150. "The heart of the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling
reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the
information." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
151. "[T]he privilege claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant." Id. at 695.
152. Id. at 667.
153. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
154. 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Louisville, Kentucky.' On one occasion, Branzburg was allowed to
observe residents of Jefferson County synthesizing hashish from mari-
juana after he promised to maintain their confidentiality. 56 In the
second case, Branzburg wrote a separate article based on information
provided by confidential sources detailing the use of drugs in Frank-
fort, Kentucky.1 57 He interviewed numerous drug users and wit-
nessed some of them smoking marijuana.' After the articles were
published, two grand juries subpoenaed Branzburg. 59 Refusing to
disclose his sources, Branzburg sought to quash the subpoenas on the
grounds that revealing the names of his sources would "destroy the
relationship of trust which he presently enjoys with those in the drug
culture" and would hamper the media's ability to "cover the views
and activities of those involved in the drug culture. ' '16° Although the
motion to quash was denied, the trial court issued a protective order
that protected Branzburg from revealing "confidential associations,
sources or information" but that required him to "answer any ques-
tions which concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of
which was actually observed by [him]."'
6 1
In re Pappas,162 the third consolidated case, involved a newsman-
photographer who reported on civil disorders in New Bedford, Mas-
sachusetts in July, 1970. Pappas was permitted to enter the Black
Panther headquarters after he agreed not to disclose anything he wit-
nessed or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid.
163
Because the raid failed to occur, Pappas never wrote a story covering
the event.I I A few months later, however, he was summoned before
a grand jury.' 65 Pappas declined to answer questions about what had
transpired inside the Panther's headquarters. 66 The trial court
denied his motion to quash the subpoena on First Amendment
grounds.' 67 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
took "judicial notice that in July, 1970, there were serious civil disor-
ders in New Bedford, which involved street barricades, exclusion of
155. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
156. Id. at 667-68.
157. Id. at 669.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 669 n.5.
161. Id. at 670.
162. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
163. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 672-73.
167. Id. at 673.
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the public from certain streets, fires, and similar turmoil.' 68 The
court held that the grand jury investigation was appropriate and that
Pappas did not have either a qualified or absolute right to resist testi-
fying.' 69 The court deemed that any adverse impact on the news
gathering activities of the press was "indirect, theoretical, and
uncertain."
70
The final consolidated case, Caldwell v. United States,171 arose
from subpoenas issued by a federal grand jury to Earl Caldwell, a
reporter for the New York Times, assigned to cover the Black Panther
Party and other militant groups.' 72 He was ordered to appear and
testify and to produce notes and tape recordings of interviews with
Black Panther officials "concerning the aims, purposes, and activities
of that organization."'' 73 He moved to quash the subpoena on the
grounds that his appearance "before the grand jury would destroy his
working relationship with the Black Panther Party and 'suppress vital
First Amendment freedoms by driving a wedge of distrust and silence
between the news media and the militants.' ,,'74 The government
argued that the grand jury was investigating possible violations of a
number of criminal statutes prohibiting threats against the Presi-
dent, 75 attempted assassination and conspiracy to assassinate the
President, 176 civil disorders, 177 interstate travel to incite a riot,1 78 and
mail fraud.' 79 The district court denied the motion to quash but
issued an order protecting Caldwell from having to disclose "confi-
dential associations, sources or information received, developed or
maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his
efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public."' 80 When
Caldwell continued to refuse to appear before the grand jury, he was
held in contempt.' 8'
The Ninth Circuit noted that "it is not the scope of the interroga-
168. Id. at 673-74.
169. Id. at 674.
170. Id.
171. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
172. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 676.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1982).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1982).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
180. In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd sub nom. Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
181. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 678.
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tion to which he must submit that is here at issue, it is whether he
need attend at all." '82 The appellate court reversed, concluding that
the press enjoys a constitutional privilege to refuse to appear before a
grand jury investigating dissenting groups, lest the "public's First
Amendment right to be informed... be jeopardized."' 3 The basis of
the court's holding was that "[t]he need for an untrammeled press
takes on special urgency in times of widespread protest and
dissent."' 8 14
The Supreme Court, reviewing all four cases, overturned the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Caldwell and affirmed the holdings of the
federal district and state courts in the remaining three cases. 85 The
Court held that reporters do not have a constitutional privilege to
refuse to appear or testify before a federal or state grand jury.'86 The
Court recognized that the First Amendment protected the media's
news gathering role8 7 but that this protection was narrower in scope
than the protection bestowed on the press' publication function. 188
Adhering to the longstanding principle that "the public ...has a
right to every man's evidence,"'' 89 the Court held that a grand jury's
investigative authority is "necessarily broad" if its duty is to be ade-
quately discharged. 90 Therefore, the state's compelling interest in
"extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination
attempts on the President, and in preventing the community from
being disrupted by violent disorders endangering both persons and
property,"' 9 1 outweighed any dubious curtailment of the media's abil-
ity to gather the news. The Court openly doubted the reporters' con-
tentions that, unless a constitutional right to refuse to appear or
testify before a grand jury was upheld, sources would be deterred
from providing newsworthy information. 92 The Court emphasized
182. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1081.
183. Id. at 1089.
184. Id. at 1084.
185. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708-09.
186. Id. at 702.
187. The dissent emphasized the importance of this protection. "A corollary of the right to
publish must be the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected
by the free-press guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded
to the process by which news is assembled and disseminated." Id. at 727 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
188. "This conclusion.., involves no restraint on what newspapers may publish ...." Id.
at 691.
189. Id. at 688 (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
190. Id. at 700.
191. Id. at 701.
192. "But we remain unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred
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that even if empirical evidence supported the reporters' argument, an
impediment to the news gathering ability could not justify according
constitutional protections to confidential sources engaging in criminal
conduct. 
193
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Powell clarified that media
defendants do retain constitutional rights in the grand jury setting.1 94
He cautioned that, in all cases where a journalist is called upon to
testify before a grand jury, the right to a free press must be balanced
against the "obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct." 95
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion criticized the majority's
shortsighted approach to the reportorial privilege issue. Raising the
specter of non-criminal confidential sources refusing to approach
newspersons for fear of disclosure in a judicial proceeding, he believed
that the Court's holding would ultimately harm the grand jury's
investigative function. 196 He delineated a three part test to reconcile a
state's interest in conducting unimpeded grand jury investigations
with First Amendment principles. Under the Stewart test:
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to
believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to
a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the infor-
mation sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information. 97
In the wake of Branzburg, despite the Court's rejection of a con-
stitutional right to refuse to name a source, state courts and legislators
from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury." Id. at
693.
193. "The preference for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual
criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal prosecution, and
this preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of constitutional protection." Id. at
691.
194. "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are
without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources." Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 710.
196. Recognizing that inhibiting the free flow of information would hinder rather than help
law enforcement, Justice Stewart stated:
The sad paradox of the Court's position is that when a grand jury may exercise
an unbridled subpoena power, and sources involved in sensitive matters become
fearful of disclosing information, the newsman will not only cease to be a useful
grand jury witness; he will cease to investigate and publish information about
issues of public import.
Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
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have adopted the Stewart Standard-thereby recognizing the signifi-
cance of reportorial privileges as an instrument of a free press.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF STATE SHIELD LAWS AND COMMON LAW
REPORTORIAL PRIVILEGES
Over half of the states have enacted state shield laws to protect
journalists.198 Most are patterned after the three-part test articulated
by Stewart and were drafted in response to Branzburg, although some
were enacted before Branzburg.'99 Although the cloak of statutory
protections differ both in construction and judicial interpretation,
state shield laws have "raised the level of consciousness among judges
and added an aura of legitimacy to the media's privilege argu-
ments." 2" Courts interpreting statutory reportorial privileges have
held that if the reporter willingly names her source, she waives the
privilege.2"1 In addition, the nature of the controversy generally
determines the scope of the state shield law. In defamation actions,
because the plaintiff has no competing constitutional interests at
stake, some courts interpret statutory reportorial privileges as grant-
ing an absolute protection against compelled disclosure.2"2 In crimi-
nal contexts, however, the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial qualifies the media's immunity.20 3
States without shield laws adopt a common law reportorial privi-
lege that may provide journalists greater protection from subpoenas
198. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1988); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (Deering 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 10
§§ 4320-4326 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (Michie 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10,
para. 8-901-909 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-45:1454 (West
Supp. 1892); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.5a (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.275 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7
(Michie 1987); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-01-06.2 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44:510-44:540 (1991); PA. CONS. STAT. tit 28,
§ 330 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208
(1980).
199. See, e.g., MARYLAND CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1989) (statute enacted
in 1896).
200. Osborn, supra note 1, at 69.
201. See, e.g., Tofani v. Maryland, 465 A.2d 413, 417 (1983) (stating that "where the
reporter acts in a manner that is inconsistent with the statutory privilege or the intention to
rely on it," she will be deemed to have waived it).
202. See, e.g., Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
907 (1982).
203. See, e.g., In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 337-38 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
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requesting disclosure of sources. Courts faced with reportorial privi-
lege issues undertake a balancing analysis which considers "the type
of proceeding, the specific information sought, and whether or not the
media participate in the controversy."2 " Similar to states that have
enacted shield laws following Branzburg, many common law reporto-
rial privilege jurisdictions have developed standards comparable to
the Stewart three-prong test.2"5 Although these tests are applied in
both civil and criminal cases, the relative weight given to each factor
varies in accordance with the type of case. In criminal cases, "scales
should tip heavily in favor of the defendant's right to a fair trial;"
however, in civil actions, "absent a showing of significant need by the
requesting party, the scales should weigh in favor of the media."20 6
In summary, statutory and common law developments in favor
of recognizing reportorial privileges indicate that the Branzburg
majority opinion is largely discredited. A partial explanation is that
Branzburg was decided in the context of the political and social tur-
moil of the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Court was reluctant
to grant protection to journalists whose sources included members of
anti-establishment groups purportedly engaged in illegal activities. In
contrast, today's confidential sources are often government officials,
and courts and legislatures, therefore, are more willing to adopt pro-
media standards that give jounalists a broader news gathering right.2 7
3. THE APPLICATION OF REPORTORIAL PRIVILEGE
JURISPRUDENCE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE/BREACH
OF CONTRACT CONTROVERSY
Reportorial privilege issues mirror many of the significant con-
cerns arising in confidential source/breach of contract controversies.
In the reportorial privilege context, if a newsperson's right to refuse to
disclose a source's identity is consistently outweighed by the state's
need to insure a broad investigative function for the grand jury, this
subjugates press freedoms to the government's interest. Prospective
sources would hesitate to speak to reporters for fear of disclosure,
204. Malheiro, supra note 149, at 93.
205. See, e.g., Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1977) (setting forth the
following test a requesting party must satisfy before a journalist is required to disclose
information: "(1) That the information is necessary or critical to the involved cause of action
or defense pled; (2) That other reasonable means available by which to obtain the information
sought have been exhausted; and (3) That it does not appear from the record the action or
defense is patently frivolous."). Id. (citations omitted).
206. Malheiro, supra note 149, at 96.
207. See generally Janet Stidman Eveleth, Freedom or Confidentiality Where Do You Draw
the Line?, 21 MD. B.J. 13 (1988) (stating that Maryland is at the forefront in insuring the free
flow of public information).
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thereby limiting the dissemination of newsworthy information. Simi-
larly, in breach of contract of confidentiality cases, if news organiza-
tions must abide by all of their confidentiality agreements, this
subjugates the press to the state's interest in enforcing valid contracts.
Media defendants either will conceal the source's name and thus pub-
lish stories that may contain skewed facts, or they will opt not to
publish anything. Both results reduce the pool of truthful informa-
tion available to the public. The ultimate censorial effect in both the
reportorial privilege and breach of contract of confidentiality settings
is parallel. The two governmental interests will hold the press hostage
in direct contravention of First Amendment rights. Courts deciding
breach of contract of confidentiality cases should therefore learn from
the post-Branzburg development of reportorial privilege jurisprudence
and adopt a contextual standard that balances the competing values
of upholding valid contracts against First Amendment guarantees.
Indeed, the fact that reportorial privilege jurisprudence deviates
entirely from the majority approach in Branzburg lends authority to
courts addressing breach of contract of confidentiality issues to nar-
rowly apply the Cohen opinion.
Current reportorial privilege cases, considered in conjunction
with the Cohen decision, reveal an unjustifiable irony. The judiciary
can abrogate confidentiality agreements, but, according to Cohen, a
news organization is absolutely liable when, in the fulfillment of its
constitutional function of disseminating truthful information, it
breaches a promise of confidentiality. 20 8 A strict application of
Cohen, which fails to undertake any balancing analysis, thus goes
beyond legitimate enforcement of the laws and intrudes upon the
institutional autonomy of the press.209
Opponents of a media friendly balancing standard, nevertheless,
assert that such standards would give the press too much discretion in
deciding when to reveal a source's identity. If a journalist is asked to
reveal a source during a grand jury investigation or other proceeding,
the newsperson can invoke a reportorial privilege. Similarly, if a
newspaper names a source and breaches a confidentiality agreement,
the newspaper can claim a First Amendment right which immunizes
it from liablity. However, the prospect that media entities will be
completely free to conceal or name sources at will is suspect. Judi-
cially manageable standards, like the reportorial privilege, that con-
sider and attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests curtail the
media's abilty to reveal or protect sources. Furthermore, even if news
208. See Dicke, supra note 2, at 1586.
209. See id. at 1586 n.187.
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organizations had an unfettered discretion to conceal or disclose their
sources, there is no explanation as to why this would constitute a con-
stitutionally unsound state of affairs.21 0
IV. TOWARDS A WORKABLE STANDARD IN CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE/BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES
Precedential authority in defamation law and reportorial privi-
lege jurisprudence establish that contextual balancing standards are
the only means by which to properly reconcile the conflicting values
of contract doctrine and First Amendment principles in the breach of
contract of confidentiality area. Courts should recognize that
promises not to disclose a source's identity have a substantial impact
on the exercise of free press rights because these agreements directly
hinder the dissemination of truthful information. While states clearly
have an important interest in enforcing valid contracts, the notion of
an absolute right to contract has been discredited and speech-restric-
tive agreements should not invariably override First Amendment con-
cerns. Judicial developments in related First Amendment cases
implicitly recognize this principle.2 1 Once it is accepted that a bal-
ancing analysis is best suited to resolve source contract cases, the
question then becomes what factors should courts consider in the bal-
ancing scheme.
This Note proposes five elements of primary concern in the confi-
dential source/breach of contract setting: (1) the substance of the
information conveyed by the source to the reporter; (2) the nature of
the communication; (3) the effect of disclosing the source's identity on
the media's aim of keeping the public abreast of newsworthy items
and thus promoting political, social and economic discourse; (4) the
source's underlying motivation for requesting confidentiality; and (5)
the reasons profferred by media defendants for breaching the confi-
dentiality agreement. Although this standard cannot insure fair
results in all cases because of the dynamic nature of reporter-source
relationships and the inability to precisely discern the motives
prompting sources to demand confidentiality, the standard does over-
come the shortcomings of Cohen by compelling courts to assess the
valid interests on both sides of the equation. Balancing competing
interests is a settled function of the judiciary, and such balancing will
guarantee more defensible outcomes than a formalistic application of
210. Hirsch, supra note 104, at 208.
211. "A mere common law label-'contract' rather than 'libel'-does not make the
Constitution disappear." POWE, supra note 55, at 189.
[Vol. 47:501
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
contract law ever could.212
Before any of the enumerated factors are considered, the
aggrieved source should have to prove: (1) by clear and convincing
evidence that a confidentiality agreement existed; (2) that the news
organization breached the agreement by publishing the source's iden-
tity; and (3) that damages resulted from the breach. The more oner-
ous standard of proof2 13 will discourage disgruntled sources from
bringing unfounded claims based on misunderstandings of vague
agreements. 214  While this requirement will frustrate many source
contract claims because confidentiality agreements are often oral with
imprecise terms, this prerequisite is necessary to protect the press
from prolonged and expensive litigation that would chill it from dis-
closing newsworthy information. 21 5  Nevertheless, in many source-
reporter relationships, principally those involving public officials, this
requirement will not pose an insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs
because promises of confidentiality are frequently well-defined and
understood as the result of repetitive transactions between journalists
and sources.216
A. The Proposed Factors for Confidential Source/Breach of
Contract Cases
The first three factors examine the nature of the information con-
veyed by the source to the reporter. An inquiry into the substantive
truth of the source's information, the type of information conveyed
and the significance of the disclosure to the underlying story will
enable courts to assess the First Amendment value to the public of the
publication.
1. SUBSTANCE OF THE INFORMATION
If a confidential source provides the newsperson with false infor-
212. Justice Stewart, advocating a balancing of interest approach in reporter-grand jury
cases, states: "No doubt the courts would be required to make some delicate judgments in
working out this accomodation. But that, after all, is the function of courts of law."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 745, 746 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
213. "Clear and convincing evidence" is an intermediate standard of proof, demanding
more than a "preponderance of the evidence" but less evidence than "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 271 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. See Jens B. Koepke, Reporter Privilege. Shield or Sword? Applying a Modified Breach
of Contract Standard When a Newsperson "Burns" a Confidential Source, 42 FED. COMM. L.J.
277, 310 (1990).
215. See Dicke, supra note 2, at 1576.
216. "The confidential interactions between journalist and public official have become so
institutionalized that they now manifest the attributes of a business transaction." Langley &
Levine, supra note 59, at 30.
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mation, no justification exists for protecting that source's identity.
Even a purely contractual analysis would fail to hold the media
defendant liable for a subsequent breach of the confidentiality agree-
ment.2 17 News organizations usually will not print information pro-
vided by a source without first corroborating the facts of the story;
therefore, reporters will likely discover the falsity of the information
before publication. This does not, however, excuse the intentional
distribution of erroneous facts to misinform public opinion, and bad
faith sources should therefore be denied recovery for any breach of
the promise of confidentiality that may follow.
This discussion presupposes that the confidential source knows
that the information conveyed is false. Where the source acts in good
faith but is misinformed or does not have access to all the relevant
information, the claim should not be automatically dismissed. Where
a source's knowledge and culpability are at issue, the source should
bear the burden of refuting the presumption of bad faith. Although
some good faith sources may be unable to refute this presumption,
courts should not penalize the media defendant for breaching a confi-
dentiality agreement based on false information. This is a harsh, but
necessary result of protecting First Amendment values. 218 Further-
more, it will have the advantage of placing the onus on sources to
ascertain that the information they provide is truthful and accurate.
In most situations, a source's information will be true in a nar-
row sense, but it will fail to disclose the entire story, thereby poten-
tially misleading the public unless all the relevant facts are revealed.
The source may be trying to purposefully distort public opinion, or he
may be unaware that the facts are incomplete. Because of the difficul-
ties inherent in determining a source's knowledge, courts must
examine the other balancing factors in judging the appropriateness of
the disclosure of the source's identity.
2. NATURE OF THE INFORMATION
This element focuses on the vitality of the source's information to
the promotion of public debate and becomes central when considered
in conjunction with the relevance of the source's identity to the story.
If the value of the information imparted by the source is of minimal
social concern, such as gossip or defamatory statements, news organi-
217. "[N]either contract doctrine nor cultural norms about when to respect promises of
confidentiality would support enforcement of such promises when the information provided by
the source is false." Levi, supra note 46, at 717.
218. "[O]nce it is understood that exercising rights of expression hurts, the claim that any
specific type of expression causes harm should be seen as a given, rather than as a reason to
curtail the exercise of First Amendment rights." POWE, supra note 55, at 104.
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zations are less justified in breaching confidentiality agreements. 21 9 If
the information relates to a matter of significant public interest, how-
ever, such as stories concerning government affairs or the conduct of
elected officials, courts should hesitate in second-guessing an editorial
decision to disclose a source's name. Although consideration of this
factor will require courts to make value judgments about news items,
this analysis is consistent with the approach taken in other cases
involving First Amendment issues, where the level of constitutional
protection depends on the nature of the speech.22 °
3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE SOURCE'S IDENTITY TO THE
PROMOTION OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
An inquiry into the relevance of the source's identity and the
effect of disclosure on the public's perception of the story's credibility
is useful in determining whether the disclosure enabled the media
entity to further the constitutionally protected goal of promoting
political, social and economic discourse. The revelation of a source's
name may affect public opinion about the story. In many cases, the
source's identity and connection to the story will acquire a separable
newsworthy value of greater significance than the underlying facts.
This is especially true if the source is a well-known public official or
figure and, in fact, courts may find it helpful to borrow from defama-
tion methodology and make distinctions based on the public or pri-
vate status of the source.221 If the source is a public official or figure,
the court should excuse the breach of the confidentiality agreement
because the source's identity would alter the public's perception of the
credibility of the information. Conversely, if the source is a non-pub-
lic individual, there is less justification for the breach because the dis-
closure adds nothing to public discourse. Because the issue of the
relevance of the source's identity will arise after disclosure has
occurred, courts will be able to make concrete assessments about the
relevance of the disclosure to a story based on the public's reaction to
the source's identity. Judicial consideration of this factor will
encourage the distribution of relevant newsworthy information while
219. "If the information concerns a trivial matter, then the identity of the source is
unimportant to the public." Koepke, supra note 214, at 312.
220. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66-70 (1976) (stating that
courts must make content distinctions in deciding First Amendment cases).
221. Some commentators advance standards that differentiate public official sources from
private individual sources. Private individual sources are generally accorded greater
protection under these standards than are public official sources when media defendants
breach their promises of confidentiality. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 104, at 203.
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preventing the media from arbitrarily disclosing confidential sources
unless such disclosure enhances public discourse.
4. THE SOURCE'S MOTIVE TO REQUEST CONFIDENTIALITY
Although a source's motives in requesting confidentiality may
not be apparent to the journalist, the particular transactional facts
may hint of the underlying motivation. Occasionally, a source's sta-
tus in an institutional hierarchy will clearly show that the source is
whistleblowing and seeks anonymity to avoid the loss of her job. In
other situations, where the exposed information would have negligible
impact on the source's position, the request for confidentiality indi-
cates that the source fits either an ego, goodwill or record correction
leak category.22 2 Still, under other circumstances, information that
discredits an official is generally leaked by a government informer
who seeks to undermine that official's support.
An attempt to characterize a confidential source's motives in
maintaining anonymity reveals the balance of power in the particular
reporter-source relationship. Newspersons frequently do not share
equal bargaining positions with sources and this may imperil First
Amendment values because any imbalance will affect the information
ultimately disseminated to the public. News organizations are vulner-
able to public officials who attempt to manipulate the press and dis-
empower the public by conveying planted information when only they
have access to all of the information relevant to a particular news
item.223 Conversely, a journalist may obtain information from an
inexperienced source in return for a promise of confidentiality the
journalist never intends to keep. A balancing standard that acknowl-
edges the potential imbalances of power in different reporter-source
relationships may aid courts in equalizing the parties' bargaining posi-
tions consistent with First Amendment goals of fully informing the
public.
Although a characterization of the source's motives for demand-
ing confidentiality will give the court an understanding of the context
of the reporter-source transaction, this factor alone cannot conclu-
sively establish the propriety of the breach of the contract of confiden-
tiality. This is because "there is no consensus that, at the abstract
level, any of these categories of reasons for leaking should be disap-
222. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
223. "The government's control of access to information and its centralized, aggressive
publicity efforts made it both necessary and convenient for the press to rely on official sources




proved per se."' 224 Furthermore, a court cannot always discern a
source's true motivations with sufficient clarity. Courts should thus
consider the other suggested factors before holding that a media
defendant's disclosure of a source deserves constitutional protection.
5. THE REASONS OFFERRED BY MEDIA DEFENDANTS TO JUSTIFY
THE DISCLOSURE
Consideration of this factor will allow courts to ascertain the
degree of constitutional protection to grant a particular breach of con-
fidentiality. Of course, this factor cannot be considered independently
of the other factors because there may be multiple reasons for any
given breach, and not all of them will be valid.225 Nevertheless, some
useful guidelines may be established. If the source is disclosed as the
result of a request from a grand jury or other body empowered to
issue subpoenas, the news organization should not be penalized for
the breach. Similarly, if a media entity breaches a confidentiality
agreement in order to safeguard its economic self-interest, as is the
case in libel actions, the defendant should not be held accountable
because the breach is not the result of any wrongful conduct by the
news organization. Although such disclosures may not appear to
directly further First Amendment values, immunity is required to
safeguard the media's status as an institution of the public, committed
to the ideal of preserving the public's "right to know." A court
should also hold a confidentiality breach permissible when the
source's identity independently becomes a subject of public concern,
such as when the information provided is a plant, misleading, false or
incomplete. In this case, the disclosure justifiably promotes public
discourse and vindicates the editorial decision to breach the
agreement.
B. Possible Criticisms of the Proposed Standard
The proposed standard provides protection to the press from the
chilling effects of litigation over breaches of contracts of confidential-
ity. By rejecting the purely contract-based analysis adopted by the
Cohen majority, this standard prevents unconstitutional judicial
incursions into the editorial decision-making process. Some critics
may, however, suggest that this approach inhibits press freedoms
because, by giving media defendants protection against source con-
tract suits, sources will be less willing to speak to journalists. Evi-
dence indicates a lack of support for this contention. Under the
224. Id. at 720.
225. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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present system, courts can, in limited circumstances, compel the press
to disclose confidential sources, yet this does not deter sources from
communicating with newspersons.226 Furthermore, news organiza-
tions already face strong institutional pressures which discourage
press entities from disclosing sources, thereby insuring that many
promises of confidentiality will be upheld. In the long run, giving
sources absolute protection for their breach of contract claims against
reporters cripples the exercise of First Amendment rights because it
may lead "not to greater willingness to confide in reporters, but rather
to an atmosphere in which reporters will be extremely reluctant to
establish confidential relationships.
' 227
Another concern about adopting a media friendly standard in
breach of contract of confidentiality cases is the apparent inability to
reconcile press arguments in favor of a right to breach with the repor-
torial privilege cases where media defendants assert the right not to
disclose confidential sources in order to protect news gathering.228
This lack of consistency does not, however, justify frustrating the
First Amendment principle that the government, through the judici-
ary, cannot regulate the news. Although this critique points to a con-
flict between the publication and news gathering roles of the press, it
fails to explain why contract law, unlike defamation, should claim a
talismanic immunity from constitutional proscriptions.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Cohen deceptively eschews any meaning-
ful inquiry into the competing values at stake. Instead, the Court
chose to blindly follow the rhetoric of the "law of general applicabil-
ity" cases. A fact-specific, contextual analysis indicates that the Trib-
une and the Dispatch would have prevailed. Although the
information Cohen provided the reporters was true, the noticeable
omission that the charges against Johnson had been vacated should
have alerted the Court to the possibility of an attempted political
smear campaign. The fact that Cohen conveyed politically charged
information of the sort traditionally accorded the greatest constitu-
tional protection and that the editors debated over the decision to
reveal Cohen's name and his connections to the IR party and
Wheelock Whitney should have led the Court to conclude in favor of
the newspapers. Anything less than a complete disclosure of Cohen's
226. See Dicke, supra note 2, at 1586.
227. Langley & Levine, supra note 64, at 24.
228. " 'It's not easy to say we can't reveal a confidential source in one case but can in
another.'" Id. (quoting Floyd Abrams, a prominent First Amendment lawyer).
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identity would have been insufficient to keep Minnesota voters fully
informed. It is likely that knowlege of Cohen's underhanded tech-
niques could be imputed to Whitney and this, in turn, would reflect
on his ethical fitness for office. It is also possible that Cohen, Flakne
and other low-ranking campaign employees acted in isolation and
that, as Whitney later alleged, he was unaware of this wrongdoing.
Minnesota voters were, however, entitled to make this choice. By
upholding the breach of contract action against the Tribune and the
Dispatch, the Court implicitly held that this information was not
within the relevant universe of information that voters should con-
sider.229 Such an outcome is an untenable intrusion by the Court
upon First Amendment values.
OLGA C. PUERTO
229. [T]he fact of Cohen's identity expanded the universe of information relevant to
the choice faced by Minnesota voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial election
.... The propriety of his leak to [the press] could be taken to reflect on his
character, which in turn could be taken to reflect on the character of the
candidate who had retained him as an adviser. An election could turn on just
such a factor; if it should.
Cohen v. Cowles, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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